Sex ratios as if not everyone is a college graduate

Quick: What percentage of 22-to-29-year-old, never-married Americans are college graduates? Not sure? Just look around at your friends and colleagues.

Actually, unlike among your friends and colleagues, the figure is only 27.5% (as of 2010). Yep, barely more than a quarter of singles in their 20s have finished college. Or, as the headlines for the last few days would have it: basically everyone.

The tweeted version of this Washington Post Wonkblog story was, “Why dating in America is completely unfair,” and the figure was titled “Best U.S. cities for dating” (subtitle: “based on college graduates ages 22-29”). This local news version listed “best U.S. cities for dating,” but never even said they were talking about college graduates only. The empirical point is simple: there are more women than men among young college graduates, so those women have a small pool to choose from, so we presume it’s hard for them to date.* (Also, in these stories everyone is straight.) In his Washington Post excerpt the author behind this, Jon Birger, talks all about college women. The headline is, “Hookup culture isn’t the real problem facing singles today. It’s math.” You have to get to the sixth paragraph before you find out that singles means college and post-college women.

In his Post interview the subject of less educated people did come up briefly — if they’re men:

Q: Some of these descriptions make it sound like the social progress and education that women have obtained has been a lose-lose situation: In the past women weren’t able to get college educations, today they can, but now they’re losing in this other realm [dating]. Is it implying that less educated men are still winning – they don’t go to college but they still get the pick of all these educated, more promiscuous women?

A: Actually, it’s the opposite. Less educated men are actually facing as challenging a dating and marriage market as the educated women. So for example, among non-college educated men in the U.S. age 22 to 29, there are 9.4 million single men versus 7.1 million single women. So the lesser-educated men face an extremely challenging data market. They do not have it easy at all.

It’s almost as if the non-college-educated woman is inconceivable. She’s certainly invisible. The people having trouble finding dates are college-educated women and non-college-educated men. By this simple sex-ratio logic, it should be raining men for the non-college women. Too bad no one thought to think of them.

Yes, the education-specific sex ratio is much better for women who haven’t been to college. That is, they are outnumbered by non-college men. But it’s not working out that well for them in mating-market terms.

I can’t show dating patterns with Census data (and neither can Birger), but I can show first-marriage rates — that is, the rate at which never-married people get married. Here are the education-specific sex ratios, and first-marriage rates, for 18-34-year-old never-married women in 279 metropolitan areas, from the 2009-2011 American Community Survey.** Blue circles for women with high school education or less, orange for BA-holders (click to enlarge):

educ-marpool

Note that for both groups marriage rates are lower for women when there are more of them relative to men — the downward sloping lines (which are weighted by population size). Fewer men for women to choose from, plus men eschew marriage when they’re surrounded by desperate women, so lower marriage rates for women. But wait: the sex ratios are so much better for non-college women — they are outnumbered by male peers in almost every market, and usually by a lot. Yet their marriage rates are still much lower than the college graduates’. Who cares?

I don’t have time to get into the reasons for this pattern; this post is media commentary more than social analysis. But let’s just agree to remember that non-college-educated women exist, and acknowledge that the marriage market is even more unfair for them. Imagine that.***


* I once argued that this could help explain why gender segregation has dropped so much faster for college graduates.

** It was 296 metro areas but I dropped the extreme ones: over 70% female and marriage rates over 0.3.

*** Remember, if we want to use marriage to solver poverty for poor single mothers, we have enough rich single men to go around, as I showed.

A little code:

I generated the figure using Stata. I got the data through a series of clunky Windows steps that aren’t easily shared, but here at least is the code for making a graph with two sets of weighted circles, each with its own weighted linear fit line, in case it helps you:

twoway (scatter Y1 X1 [w=count1], mc(none) mlc(blue) mlwidth(vthin)) ///

(scatter Y2 X2 [w=count2], mc(none) mlc(orange_red) mlwidth(vthin)) ///

(lfit Y1 X1 [w=count1], lc(blue)) ///

(lfit Y2 X2 [w=count2], lc(orange_red)) , ///

xlabel(30(10)70) ylabel(0(.1).3)

3 Comments

Filed under In the news

Comment on Goffman’s survey, American Sociological Review rejection edition

7241915012_29fc2a7211_k

Peer Review, by Gary Night. https://flic.kr/p/c2WH2E

Background:

  • I reviewed Alice Goffman’s book, On The Run.
  • I complained that her dissertation was not made public, despite being awarded the American Sociological Association’s dissertation prize. I proposed a rule change for the association, requiring that the winning dissertation be “publicly available through a suitable academic repository by the time of the ASA meeting at which the award is granted.” (The rule change is moving through the process.)
  • When her dissertation was released, I complained about the rationale for the delay.
  • My critique of the survey that was part of her research grew into a formal comment (PDF) submitted to American Sociological Review.

In this post I don’t have anything to add about Alice Goffman’s work. This is about what we can learn from this and other incidents to improve our social science and its contribution to the wider social discourse. As Goffman’s TED Talk passed 1 million views, we have had good conversations about replicability and transparency in research, and about ethics in ethnography. And of course about the impact of criminal justice system and over-policing on African Americans, the intended target of her work. This post is about how we deal with errors in our scholarly publishing.

My comment was rejected by the American Sociological Review.

You might not realize this, but unlike many scientific journals, except for “errata” notices, which are for typos and editing errors, ASR has no normal way of acknowledging or correcting errors in research. To my knowledge ASR has never retracted an article or published an editor’s note explaining how an article, or part of an article, is wrong. Instead, they publish Comments (and Replies). The Comments are submitted and reviewed anonymously by peer reviewers just like an article, and then if the Comment is accepted the original author responds (maybe followed by a rejoinder). It’s a cumbersome and often combative process, often mixing theoretical with methodological critiques. And it creates a very high hurdle to leap, and a long delay, before the journal can correct itself.

In this post I’ll briefly summarize my comment, then post the ASR editors’ decision letter and reviews.

Comment: Survey and ethnography

I wrote the comment about Goffman’s 2009 ASR article for accountability. The article turned out to be the first step toward a major book, so ASR played a gatekeeping role for a much wider reading audience, which is great. But then it should take responsibility to notify readers about errors in its pages.

My critique boiled down to these points:

  • The article describes the survey as including all households in the neighborhood, which is not the case, and used statistics from the survey to describe the neighborhood (its racial composition and rates of government assistance), which is not justified.
  • The survey includes some number (probably a lot) of men who did not live in the neighborhood, but who were described as “in residence” in the article, despite being “absent because they were in the military, at job training programs (like JobCorp), or away in jail, prison, drug rehab centers, or halfway houses.” There is no information about how or whether such men were contacted, or how the information about them was obtained (or how many in her sample were not actually “in residence”).
  • The survey results are incongruous with the description of the neighborhood in the text, and — when compared with data from other sources — describe an apparently anomalous social setting. She reported finding more than twice as many men (ages 18-30) per household as the Census Bureau reports from their American Community Survey of Black neighborhoods in Philadelphia (1.42 versus .60 per household). She reported that 39% of these men had warrants for violating probation or parole in the prior three years. Using some numbers from other sources on violation rates, that translates into between 65% and 79% of the young men in the neighborhood being on probation or parole — very high for a neighborhood described as “nice and quiet” and not “particularly dangerous or crime-ridden.”
  • None of this can be thoroughly evaluated because the reporting of the data and methodology for the survey were inadequate to replicate or even understand what was reported.

You can read my comment here in PDF. Since I aired it out on this blog before submitting it, making it about as anonymous as a lot of other peer-review submissions, I see no reason to shroud the process any further. The editors’ letter I received is signed by the current editors — Omar Lizardo, Rory McVeigh, and Sarah Mustillo — although I submitted the piece before they officially took over (the editors at the time of my submission were Larry W. Isaac and Holly J. McCammon). The reviewers are of course anonymous. My final comment is at the end.

ASR letter and reviews

Editors’ letter:

25-Aug-2015

Dear Prof. Cohen:

The reviews are in on your manuscript, “Survey and ethnography: Comment on Goffman’s ‘On the Run’.” After careful reading and consideration, we have decided not to accept your manuscript for publication in American Sociological Review (ASR).  Our decision is based on the reviewers’ comments, our reading of the manuscript, an overall assessment of the significance of the contribution of the manuscript to sociological knowledge, and an estimate of the likelihood of a successful revision.

As you will see, there was a range of opinions among the reviewers of your submission.  Reviewer 1 feels strongly that the comment should not be published, reviewer 3 feels strongly that it should be published, and reviewer 2 falls in between.  That reviewer sees merit in the criticisms but also suggests that the author’s arguments seem overstated in places and stray at times from discussion that is directly relevant to a critique of the original article’s alleged shortcomings.

As editors of the journal, we feel it is essential that we focus on the comment’s critique of the original ASR article (which was published in 2009), rather than the recently published book or controversy and debate that is not directly related to the submitted comment.  We must consider not only the merits of the arguments and evidence in the submitted comment, but also whether the comment is important enough to occupy space that could otherwise be used for publishing new research.  With these factors in mind, we feel that the main result that would come from publishing the comment would be that valuable space in the journal would be devoted to making a point that Goffman has already acknowledged elsewhere (that she did not employ probability sampling).

As the author of the comment acknowledges, there is actually very little discussion of, or use of, the survey data in Goffman’s article.   We feel that the crux of the argument (about the survey) rests on a single sentence found on page 342 of the original article:  “The five blocks known as 6th street are 93 percent Black, according to a survey of residents that Chuck and I conducted in 2007.”  The comment author is interpreting that to mean that Goffman is claiming she conducted scientific probability sampling (with all households in the defined space as the sampling frame).  It is important to note here that Goffman does not actually make that claim in the article.  It is something that some readers might infer.  But we are quite sure that many other readers simply assumed that this is based on nonprobability sampling or convenience sampling.  Goffman speaks of it as a survey she conducted when she was an undergraduate student with one of the young men from the neighborhood.  Given that description of the survey, we expect many readers assumed it was a convenience sample rather than a well-designed probability sample.  Would it have been better if Goffman had made that more explicit in the original article?  Yes.

In hindsight, it seems safe to say that most scholars (probably including Goffman) would say that the brief mentions of the survey data should have been excluded from the article.  In part, this is because the reported survey findings play such a minor role in the contribution that the paper aims to make.

We truly appreciate the opportunity to review your manuscript, and hope that you will continue to think of ASR for your future research.

Sincerely,

Omar Lizardo, Rory McVeigh, and Sarah Mustillo

Editors, American Sociological Review

Reviewer: 1

This paper seeks to provide a critique of the survey data employed in Goffman (2009).  Drawing on evidence from the American Community Survey, the author argues that data presented in Goffman (2009) about the community in which she conducted her ethnography is suspect.  The author draws attention to remarkably high numbers of men living in households (compared with estimates derived from ACS data) and what s/he calls an “extremely high number” of outstanding warrants reported by Goffman.  S/he raises the concern that Goffman (2009) did not provide readers with enough information about the survey and its methodology for them to independently evaluate its merits and thus, ultimately, calls into question the generalizability of Goffman’s survey results.

This paper joins a chorus of critiques of Goffman’s (2009) research and subsequent book.  This critique is novel in that the critique is focused on the survey aspect of the research rather than on Goffman’s persona or an expressed disbelief of or distaste for her research findings (although that could certainly be an implication of this critique).

I will not comment on the reliability, validity or generalizability of Goffman’s (2009) evidence, but I believe this paper is fundamentally flawed.  There are two key problems with this paper.  First the core argument of the paper (critique) is inadequately situated in relation to previous research and theory.  Second, the argument is insufficiently supported by empirical evidence.

The framing of the paper is not aligned with the core empirical aims of the paper.  I’m not exactly sure what to recommend here because it seems as if this is written for a more general audience and not a sociological one.  It strikes me as unusual, if not odd, to reference the popularity of a paper as a motivation for its critique.  Whether or not Goffman’s work is widely cited in sociological or other circles is irrelevant for this or any other critique of the work.  All social science research should be held to the same standards and each piece of scholarship should be evaluated on its own merits.

I would recommend that the author better align the framing of the paper with its empirical punchline.  In my reading the core criticism of this paper is that the Goffman (2009) has not provided sufficient information for someone to replicate or validate her results using existing survey data.  Although it may be less flashy, it seems more appropriate to frame the paper around how to evaluate social science research.  I’d advise the author to tone down the moralizing and discussion of ethics.  If one is to levy such a strong (and strongly worded) critique, one needs to root it firmly in established methods of social science.

That leads to the second, and perhaps even more fundamental, flaw.  If one is to levy such a strong (and strongly worded) critique, one needs to provide adequate empirical evidence to substantiate her/his claims.  Existing survey data from the ACS are not designed to address the kinds of questions Goffman engages in the paper and thus it is not appropriate for evaluating the reliability or validity of her survey research.  Numerous studies have established that large scale surveys like the ACS under-enumerate black men living in cities.  They fall into the “hard-to-reach” population that evade survey takers and census enumerators.  Survey researchers widely acknowledge this problem and Goffman’s research, rather than resolving the issue, raises important questions about the extent to which the criminal justice system may contribute to difficulties for conventional social science research data collection methods.  Perhaps the author can adopt a different, more scholarly, less authoritative, approach and turn the inconsistencies between her/his findings with the ACS and Goffman’s survey findings into a puzzle.  How can these two surveys generate such inconsistent findings?

Just like any survey, the ACS has many strengths.  But, the ACS is not well-suited to construct small area estimates of hard-to-reach populations.  The author’s attempt to do so is laudable but the simplicity of her/his analysis trivializes the difficultly in reaching some of the most disadvantaged segments of the population in conventional survey research.  It also trivializes one of the key insights of Goffman’s work and one that has been established previously and replicated by others: criminal justice contact fundamentally upends social relationships and living arrangements.

Furthermore, the ACS doesn’t ask any questions about criminal justice contact in a way that can help establish the validity of results for disadvantaged segments of the population who are most at-risk of criminal justice contact.  It is impossible to determine using the ACS how many men (or women) in the United States, Pennsylvania, or Philadelphia (or any neighborhood therein), have an outstanding warrant.  The ACS doesn’t ask about criminal justice contact, it doesn’t ask about outstanding warrants, and it isn’t designed to tap into the transient experiences of many people who have had criminal justice contact.  The author provides no data to evaluate the validity of Goffman’s claims about outstanding warrants.  Advancements in social science cannot be established from a “she said”, “he said” debate (e.g., FN 9-10).  That kind of argument risks a kind of intellectual policing that is antithetical to established standards of evaluating social science research.  That being said, someone should collect this evidence or at a minimum estimate, using indirect estimation methods, what fraction of different socio-demographic groups have outstanding warrants.

Although I believe that this paper is fundamentally flawed both in its framing and provision of evidence, I would like to encourage the author to replicate Goffman’s research.  That could involve an extended ethnography in a disadvantaged neighborhood in Philadelphia or another similar city.  That could also involve conducting a small area survey of a disadvantaged, predominantly black, neighborhood in a city with similar criminal justice policies and practices as Philadelphia in the period of Goffman’s study.  This kind of research is painstaking, time consuming, and sorely needed exactly because surveys like the ACS don’t – and can’t – adequately describe or explain social life among the most disadvantaged who are most likely to be missing from such surveys.

Reviewer: 2

I read this manuscript several times. It is more than a comment, it seems. It is 1) a critique of the description of survey methods in GASR and 2) a request for some action from ASR “to acknowledge errors when they occur.” The errors here have to do with Goffman’s description of survey methods in GASR, which the author describes in detail. This dual focus read as distracting at times. The manuscript would benefit from a more squarely focused critique of the description of survey methods in GASR.

Still, the author’s comment raises some valid concerns. The author’s primary concern is that the survey Goffman references in her 2009 ASR article is not described in enough detail to assess its accuracy or usefulness to a community of scholars. The author argues that some clarification is needed to properly understand the claims made in the book regarding the prevalence of men “on the run” and the degree to which the experience of the small group of men followed closely by Goffman is representative of most poor, Black men in segregated inner city communities. The author also cites a recent publication in which Goffman claims that the description provided in ASR is erroneous. If this is the case, it seems prudent for ASR to not only consider the author’s comments, but also to provide Goffman with an opportunity to correct the record.

I am not an expert in survey methods, but there are moments where the author’s interpretation of Goffman’s description seems overstated, which weakens the critique. For example, the author claims that Goffman is arguing that the entirety of the experience of the 6th Street crew is representative of the entire neighborhood, which is not necessarily what I gather from a close reading of GASR (although it may certainly be what has been taken up in popular discourse on the book). While there is overlap of the experience of being “on the run,” namely, your life is constrained in ways that it isn’t for those not on the run, it does appear that Goffman also uses the survey to describe a population that is distinct in important ways from the young men she followed on 6th street. The latter group has been “charged for more serious offenses like drugs and violent crimes,” she writes (this is the group that Sharkey argues might need to be “on the run”), while the larger group of men, whose information was gathered using survey data, were typically dealing with “more minor infractions”: “In the 6th Street neighborhood, a person was occasionally ‘on the run’ because he was a suspect in a shooting or robbery, but most people around 6th street had warrants out for far more minor infractions [emphasis mine].”

So, as I read it (I’ve also read the book), there are two groups: one “on the run” as a consequence of serious offenses and others “on the run” as a consequence of minor infractions. The consequence of being “on the run” is similar, even if the reason one is “on the run” varies.

The questions that remain are questions of prevalence and generalizability. The author asks: How many men in the neighborhood are “on the run” (for any reason)? How similar is this neighborhood to other neighborhoods? Answers to this question do rely on an accurate description of survey methods and data, as the author suggests.

This leads us to the most pressing and clearly argued question from the author: What is the survey population? Is it 1) “people around 6th Street” who also reside in the 6th Street neighborhood (of which, based on Goffman’s definition of in residence, are distributed across 217 distinct households in the neighborhood, however the neighborhood is defined e.g., 5 blocks or 6 blocks) or 2) the entirety of the neighborhood, which is made up of 217 households. It appears from the explanation from Goffman cited by the author that it is the former (“of the 217 households we interviewed,” which should probably read, of the 308 men we interviewed, all of whom reside in the neighborhood (based on Goffman’s definition of residence), 144 had a warrant…). Either way, the author makes a strong case for the need for clarification of this point.

The author goes on to explain the consequences of not accurately distinguishing among the two possibilities described above (or some other), but it seems like a good first step would be to request a clarification (the author could do this directly) and to allow more space than is allowed in a newspaper article to provide the type of explanation that could address the concerns of the author.

Is this the purpose of the comment? Or is the purpose of the comment merely to place a critique on record?  The primary objective is not entirely clear in the present manuscript.

The author’s comment is strong enough to encourage ASR to think through possibilities for correcting the record. As a critique of the survey methods, the comment would benefit from more focus. The comment could also do a better job of contextualizing or comparing/contrasting the use of survey methods in GASR with other ethnographic studies that incorporate survey methods (at the moment such references appear in footnotes).

Reviewer: 3

This comment exposes major errors in the survey methodology for Goffman’s article.  One major flaw is that the goffman article describes the survey as inclusive of all households in the neighborhood but later, in press interviews, discloses that it is not representative of all households in the neighborhood.  Another flaw that the author exposes is goffman’s data and methodological reporting not being up to par to sociological standards.  Finally, the author argues that the data from the survey does not match the ethnographic data.

Overall, I agree with the authors assertions that the survey component is flawed.  This is an important point because the article claims a large component of its substance from the survey instrument.  The survey helped goffman to bolster generalizability , and arguably, garner worthiness of publication in ASR.  If the massive errors in the survey had been exposed early on it is possible that ASR might have held back on publishing this article.

I am in agreement that ASR should correct the error highlighted on page 4 that the data set is not of the entire neighborhood but of random households/individuals given the survey in an informal way and that the sampling strategy should be described.  Goffman should aknowledge that this was a non-representative convenience sample, used for bolstering field observations.  It would follow then that the survey component of the ASR article would have to be rendered invalid and that only the field data in the article should be taken at face value.  Goffman should also be asked to provide a commentary on her survey methodology.

The author points out some compelling anomalies from the goffman survey and general social survey data and other representative data.  At best, goffman made serious mistakes with the survey and needs to be asked to show those mistakes and her survey methodology or she made up some of the data in the survey and appropriate action must be taken by ASR.  I agree with the authors final assessment, that the survey results be disregarded and the article be republished without mention of such results or with mention of the results albeit showing all of its errors and demonstrating the survey methodology.

My response

Regular readers can probably imagine my long, overblown, hyperventilating response to Reviewer 1, so I’ll just leave that to your imagination. On the bottom line, I disagree with the editors’ decision, but I can’t really blame them. Would it really be worth some number of pages in the journal, plus a reply and rejoinder, to hash this out? Within the constraints of the ASR format, maybe the pages aren’t worth it. And the result would not have been a definitive statement anyway, but rather just another debate among sociologists.

What else could they have done? Maybe it would have been better if the editors could simply append a note to the article advising readers that the survey is not accurately described, and cautioning against interpreting it as representative — with a link to the comment online somewhere explaining the problem. (Even so of course Goffman should have a chance to respond, and so on.)

It’s just wrong that now the editors acknowledge there is something wrong in their journal — although we seem to disagree about how serious the problem is — but no one is going to formally notify the future readers of the article. That seems like bad scholarly communication. I’ve said from the beginning that there’s no need for a high-volume conversation about this, or attack on anyone’s integrity or motives. There are important things in this research, and it’s also highly flawed. Acknowledge the errors — so they don’t compound — and move on.

This incident can help us learn lessons with implications up and down the publishing system. Here are a couple. At the level of social science research reporting: don’t publish survey results data without sufficient methodological documentation — let’s have the instrument and protocol, the code, and access to the data. At the system level of publishing, why do we still have journals with cost-defined page limits? Because for-profit publishing is more important than scholarly communication. The sooner we get out from under that 19th-century habit the better.

8 Comments

Filed under Me @ work

Conservatives don’t have happier marriages

On Vice’s Munchies channel (who knew), Hillary Pollack links to an excruciating Fox News chat about how Republicans have happier marriages, which I wrote about the other day.

The Fox intro says, “According to a new study, Republicans are far happier, and more stable, than Democrats are.” (Then they inaccurately described the data as being about how “married couples who describe themselves…”, when the data are about individual spouses, not couples.)

I already showed the premise isn’t true, at least as far as expressed happiness in marriage. The two groups with the highest reported marriage happiness, with demographic controls, are strong Democrats and strong Republicans, and the difference between them isn’t statistically significant.

So we can take Brad Wilcox’s words of wisdom on the meaning of Republican marital bliss in that light — that is, not.

bw1

But there is another problem here, which is he is conflating party identification with political ideology. As when he tweeted this:

bw2

“Republican” is not the same as “conservative.” In fact, the General Social Survey — the data we’re using here — has a question on political ideology as well as party identification. (Thanks to Omar Lizardo for reminding me of this.) They ask whether you “think of yourself as liberal or conservative.” And 15% of people identifying as Democrats consider themselves conservative (Republicans are much more consistently conservative).

polviewpartyid

If you’re going to claim that “conservatives have happier marriages,” you should use the political views question.* And that is even worse for this theory than the party identification (which I’m sure has nothing to do with why Wilcox chose to use the variable he did). Here is my result from the other day, using political views instead**:

marital-happiness-partyid.xlsx

So, what was that about conservatives having happier marriages?

Extreme liberals are a small group, just 3% of the this GSS sample (compared with “strong Democrats, who are 12%). But that difference is big enough to be statistically significant, with control variables, from each of the other groups (at p<.05, except the extreme conservatives, p<.10, in two-tailed tests).

David Leonhardt and other journalists covering “reports” from Brad Wilcox should consider the merits of peer review or, absent that, checking around a little before serving up this bologna. I understand there isn’t time for our peer review system to vet every little partisan claim, and I’ve served up some non-peer-reviewed reports to the news media, too. I would always encourage journalists to at least check around before running with a splashy claim.

Notes:

* This doesn’t mean ideology is always a better measure, of course. For example, when it comes to attitudes toward health care spending, this paper by Stephen Morgan and Minhyoung Kang shows that party identification is a strong predictor even controlling for ideology. But in this case the issue is conservative values, not some partisan policy matter.

** Use the code I posted the other day, but with POLVIEWS instead of PARTYID

5 Comments

Filed under In the news

Why it’s rotten to tell someone they’re poor because of when they had their kids

The “success sequence” is an idea from Ron Haskins and Isabel Sawhill at the Brookings Institution. They want to balance government investment and “personal responsibility” to reduce poverty. By personal responsibility, they mean adherence to what they call “the three norms”: complete high school, work full time, wait until you’re 21 and married to have children. If you do that — and smile while doing it — they’re willing to spot you a little welfare and some education.

I’ll describe it, and some criticism of the idea, then show a little data analysis.

Haskins and Sawhill claim to have analyzed data to show that when you follow all three of these norms, you have a 98% chance of not being poor. This is how they illustrate it (from this slideshow):

success-sequence-slideMatt Bruenig at Demos has an important post explaining how misleading — and wrong — this is. There are three main problems, briefly:

  1. The high school degree and full-time job is doing almost all of the work. With those two hurdles complete, you’re already down under 4% poverty. So the marriage stuff is mostly moralizing for political purposes.
  2. The data they used does not include the information necessary to see whether people were married when they had their children — it doesn’t have marital history. So they didn’t even do the analysis they said they did.
  3. Family complications mess this up badly. In particular, if a person (say, a man), has children with a partner and never lives with them, he shows up as having met the “norms” because the data don’t show him having any children — it’s a household survey, so absent parents aren’t parents in the data.

So if someone gives you the “success sequence” thing, just remember, the analysis is baloney, and the bottom line is decent full-time jobs are what keep people out of poverty (by the official poverty measure, of course).

Analysis

Anyway, I can go a little further using the American Community Survey, which includes data on the year of each person’s most recent marriage, and the number of times they’ve been married. So, limiting the data to first-time married parents, I can check the age of their oldest child and see whether it was born before they were married, and before the parent was age 21. Some of the above problems still apply, but this is something. And it enables me to underscore Bruenig’s point that step three of the success sequence is not pulling its weight.

(Note this analysis is just about the timing of births for people who are currently married. Single parents of course have higher poverty rates that you can’t attribute to the timing of their births without more information than the ACS has.)

Using the 2013 ACS provided by IPUMS, I took all married parents, living in their own households, age 18 or older, married for the first time, with a child under 18 in the household. Then I used the job norm (self or spouse full-time employed), the education norm (high school complete), and the parent norm in two parts (child born after marriage, child born after age 21), as well as other variables, to see their relative contribution to not being poor. The other variables were additional education (BA degree), race/ethnicity, age, sex, disability, and nativity

This figure shows the marginal effects. That is, how much does the chance of being in poverty change with each of these conditions, holding all the others constant at their means? Click to enlarge:

success sequence acs 2013.xlsx

If the oldest child in the family was born before the year of the parents’ marriage, the chance of being in poverty is increased by 0.4%. If the child was born before the parent was 21, the chance goes up by 0.6%. This seems reasonable to me, given the potential hardships associated with single and early parenthood. But compare: Not having a high school diploma increases the chance of poverty by 2.2%, and neither spouse having a full-time job increases the chance by 6.4%.

Remember, these are all effects holding constant everything else in the model. If you just look at the difference between those who fulfill the parenting “norm” and those who don’t, it’s much bigger. Among people with a full-time job in the family and a high school degree, the poverty rate is 2.8% for people whose oldest present child was born after they were married and 21, versus 9.1% for the people who let us all down on the childbearing norm. But that big difference is mostly because of education and race/ethnicity and disability, etc.

In short, this exposes how rotten it is to tell someone they are poor because of when they had their kids. A decent job and some education would mean a lot more than your sermon.

Code

Here is the IPUMS codebook for my download, and the Stata .do file for the analysis.

3 Comments

Filed under In the news

Marriage equality is official now that it’s in The Family textbook

Well, actually, it’s in a special addendum to the textbook that W. W. Norton is just releasing.

The book I wrote, The Family: Diversity, Inequality, and Social Change, hit the streets a year ago today. Marriage equality plays a significant part in the story, much larger than the proportion of the population that is directly affected by the changing law. That’s because of the high-stakes nature of the debate for so many people, and because of its symbolic acceptance of rising family diversity — the main theme of the book.

So when the law suddenly, and fundamentally, changed this summer, we decided we needed an update for instructors teaching this fall. The three-page supplement reviews the political and legal events leading up to the June 26 Obergefell decision, and the logic of the legal questions addressed — along with a little context on the place of marriage equality in the story of family change. I hope it’s helpful for you.

The update is now available on the Norton website, here, and on my teaching page. While you’re at it, you should visit the book’s homepage, and see what we have in store for you if you teach family sociology (and request an exam copy), here.

Also:

  • A symposium with 12 writers and researchers addressing the concept, “After marriage equality,” which Syed Ali and I edited for Contexts.
  • My whole series of blog posts on marriage equality is archived under the homogamy tag.

whitehouserainbow

Leave a comment

Filed under Me @ work

Does doing difference deny dominance? (vocal fry, sports sex testing, and resting bitch face edition)

Does women’s behavior make them less equal?

“Guess what,” Camille Paglia said the other day in Salon. “Women are different than men!”

Usually when people point out gender differences, they don’t just mean men and women are different, they mean “women are different from men.” As an archetypal example, in “Do women really want equality?” Kay Hymowitz argued that women don’t want to model their professional lives on male standards, and therefore they don’t really want equality:

This hints at the problem with the equality-by-the-numbers approach: it presumes women want absolute parity in all things measurable, and that the average woman wants to work as many hours as the average man, that they want to be CEOs, heads of state, surgeons and Cabinet heads just as much as men do.

So the male professional standard is just there, and the question is what women will do if they want equality. Of course, what women (and men) want is a product of social interaction, so it’s not an abstract quality separate from social context. But also, I’m no statistician but I know that when there is a gap between two variable quantities (such as men’s and women’s average hours in paid work), moving one of them isn’t the only way to bring them closer together. In other words — men could change, too.

What about vocal fry and uptalk?

Naomi Wolf would add these speech patterns to the list of women’s self-inflicted impediments:

“Vocal fry” has joined more traditional young-women voice mannerisms such as run-ons, breathiness and the dreaded question marks in sentences (known by linguists as uptalk) to undermine these women’s authority in newly distinctive ways.

So the male speech pattern is just there, and the question is what women will do if they want equality. In opposition is the argument made here:

Teaching young women to accommodate to the linguistic preferences, a.k.a. prejudices, of the men who run law firms and engineering companies is doing the patriarchy’s work for it. It’s accepting that there’s a problem with women’s speech, rather than a problem with sexist attitudes to women’s speech.

So some feminists want more respect for vocal fry, saying: “when your dads bitch about the way you talk it’s because they’re just trying to not listen to you talk, period, so fuck your dads.” This stance is not just feminist, it’s young feminist:

[Vocal fry] is the speaking equivalent of “you ain’t shit,” an affectation of the perpetually unbothered. It’s a protective force between the pejorative You — dads, Sales types, bosses, basically anyone who represents the establishment — and the collective Us, which is to say, a misunderstood generation that inherited a whole landscape of bullshit because y’all didn’t fix it when you had the goddamn chance.

Elevating vocal fry to a virtue would be more persuasive if the common examples weren’t mostly rich women talking about basically nothing. As an old dad who has done nothing to fix society, I personally bitched about the way the two women interviewed for this NPR story fried and uptalked their way through an excruciating seven-minute conversation about the awesomeness of selfie culture.

Of course, this being a patriarchal society, double standards abound. Men fry their vocals, too, and no one cares. (I myself transcribed this awesome piece of run-on from a young man on the radio once, but I didn’t blame him for holding all men back.) And then there’s resting bitch face, “a face that, when at ease, is perceived as angry, irritated or simply … expressionless,” according to Jessica Bennett (whose RBF is not to be trifled with). But only for women:

“When a man looks stern, or serious, or grumpy, it’s simply the default,” said Rachel Simmons, an author and leadership consultant at Smith College. “We don’t inherently judge the moodiness of a male face. But as women, we are almost expected to put on a smile. So if we don’t, it’s deemed ‘bitchy.’ ”

Many men feel that RBF is a blight on their scenery — one they have the right to demand improvement upon — which is why they tell random women on the street to smile. Plus, they just like exercising informal personal power over random women who aren’t conforming with various social rules, including the rule that you show your love for patriarchy at all times.

Sometimes women should act more like men, because some of the behavior that men would otherwise own is about power and access and self-determination and other things that women want and deserve. And some gender differences are just little pieces of the symbolic architecture that helps establish that men and women are different, which means women are different, which means men are dominant. Difference for its own sake is bad for gender equality.

It’s tricky because we don’t have different audiences for different messages anymore, but we need two true messages at once: It’s wrong to discriminate against and shame women for their speech patterns, and it’s a good idea not to undermine yourself with speech patterns that annoy or distract men and old people.

What about sports?

One process people use to essentialize sex categories — to enhance rather than downplay gender differences — is sex segregated sports (which I last wrote about with regard to Caster Semenya). As is the case with many gender differences, our sports establishment and culture is built around male standards, which is why women are granted a protected sphere of difference . Writes Vanessa Heggie in a fascinating historical review of sex testing in international sports:

Sex testing, after all, is a tautological (or at least circular) process: the activities which we recognise as sports are overwhelmingly those which favour a physiology which we consider ‘masculine’. As a general rule, the competitor who is taller, has a higher muscle-to-fat ratio, and the larger heart and lungs (plus some other cardio-respiratory factors) will have the sporting advantage. It is therefore inevitable that any woman who is good at sport will tend to demonstrate a more ‘masculine’ physique than women who are not good at sport. What the sex test effectively does, therefore, is provide an upper limit for women’s sporting performance; there is a point at which your masculine-style body is declared ‘too masculine’, and you are disqualified, regardless of your personal gender identity. For men there is no equivalent upper physiological limit – no kind of genetic, or hormonal, or physiological advantage is tested for, even if these would give a ‘super masculine’ athlete a distinct advantage over the merely very athletic ‘normal’ male.

Heggie adds that, for every claim of gender fraud that turns out to be “true” — that is, a male or intersex person with an unfair advantage competing as a woman, which is vanishingly rare — there are countless cases of “suspicions, rumour, and inuendo” regarding women who are simply unusually big and muscular. As in wide swaths of the professional world, men are the standard, and successful women often look or act more like men — and then they are shamed or penalized for not performing their gender correctly.

There is a sex versus gender issue here, however. When men’s behavior or activity is the standard by which all are judged, there are gendered (social) reasons women have trouble competing — such as exclusion from training, hiring, promotion, and social networks, or socially-defined burdens (such as childcare) impeding their progress toward the top ranks. And then sometimes there are sex (biological) reasons women can’t win, such as in most organized sports.

Here are the world record times in the 800-meter foot race for men and women, from 1922 to the present:

For all the fuss over Caster Semenya’s natural hormone levels, she never got to within two seconds of Jarmila Kratochvílová‘s 1983 record of 1:53.3. It’s presumed that Kratochvílová was taking steroids, but not proven — though the longer the time that lapses since her record was achieved, the more that seems likely.

It’s very telling that no woman has beaten Kratochvílová’s record. In fact, after women made steady progress toward equality for four decades, men’s lead has increased by almost a second in the last four decades. In this contest of physiology, the fastest women apparently cannot compete with the fastest men. This makes a strong case for sex not gender as the difference-maker. But, as I’ve argued before, that does not mean we’re outside the realm of social construction, because the line has to be drawn somewhere to create the protective arena in which women can compete with each other, and that line is defined socially.

We solve the problem if we “stop pawning this fundamentally social question off onto scientists,” say Rebecca Jordan-Young and Katrina Karkazis. They want to “let all legally recognized women compete. Period.” But if it is fundamentally social, instead of biological, why are men’s times so much faster?

Aside: How deep a difference

Thinking about all this, I was half interested in what Camille Paglia had to say in Salon about the similarity between Bill Clinton and Bill Cosby — in some ways obvious, in some ways an obvious overreach — and I might even have looked up her book, Sexual Personae, if she hadn’t said the book “of course is far too complex for the ordinary feminist or academic mind!” So that rules me out.

Anyway, in the interview she goes beyond the idea that men and women have different preferences and habits. Here is “why women are having so much trouble dealing with men in the feminist era”:

equality in the workplace is not going to solve the problems between men and women which are occurring in the private, emotional realm, where every man is subordinate to women, because he emerged as a tiny helpless thing from a woman’s body. Professional women today don’t want to think about this or deal with it.

Not recognizing such inherent conditions is a problem for modern feminism, she believes:

Guess what – women are different than men! When will feminism wake up to this basic reality? Women relate differently to each other than they do to men. And straight men do not have the same communication skills or values as women – their brains are different!

In this view, which you could (she does) loosely call Freudian, the sex difference and the gender difference are nearly unified, because the psychological basis for difference is universally present at birth. The short-sighted feminist attempt to erase gender difference thus makes both women and men miserable:

Now we’re working side-by-side in offices at the same job. Women want to leave at the end of the day and have a happy marriage at home, but then they put all this pressure on men because they expect them to be exactly like their female friends. If they feel restlessness or misery or malaise, they automatically blame it on men. Men are not doing enough; men aren’t sharing enough. But it’s not the fault of men that we have this crazy and rather neurotic system where women are now functioning like men in the workplace, with all its material rewards.

What is out of whack is women entering men’s sphere, apparently.

The political stakes attached to the nature and extent of difference between male and female people makes it an ever-important question. It underlies, for example, the opposition to marriage equality, as demonstrated in the terrible Catholic video series called Humanum, where you might hear such nuggets of wisdom as this:

In every human being there is a masculine part, and a feminine part, and as a man I get this feminine part from my mother or from the maternal image in my family, and I get this masculine image from the paternal part, from the paternal image in my family. And I get to make some equilibrium inside. And without this equilibrium my humanity is not really sane.

There is a difference between saying there is a difference between men and women and saying there is such a difference between men and women that your humanity is not complete unless you have both a mother and father.

Difference and dominance

Times like this, like it or not, are good times to revisit Catharine MacKinnon’s essay, “Difference and dominance: On sex discrimination.”*

There is a politics to this. Concealed is the substantive way in which man has become the measure of all things. Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his measure. Under the difference standard, we are measured according to our lack of correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our distance from his measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard, and the special protection rule is simply the female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for both.

Between the rock of neutrality and the hard place of special protection. Difference and dominance.

In reality … virtually every quality that distinguishes men from women is already affirmatively compensated in this society. Men’s physiology defines most sports … their socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define merit, their objectification of life defines art, their military service defines citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability to get along with each other — their wars and rulerships — defines history, their image defines god, and their genitals define sex.

So, check that referent. Of course, those women who work more hours, adopt male speech patterns and facial expressions, and run faster, may do better than those who do not (under the risk of overstepping). But why can’t women embrace gender difference in things like speech patterns, and wield them in the service of equality? They might. But under these conditions, enhancing gender differences works against inequality.

* There are several versions of this essay available by Googling. I’m quoting the one published in her 1988 book Feminism Unmodified.

10 Comments

Filed under In the news