Category Archives: Me @ work

Interview: Independence, uncertainty, defamilialization

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My photo from Flickr: https://flic.kr/p/Fet9Dc

I had an hour-long discussion about the decline of marriage on WYPR, Baltimore public radio, a couple weeks ago. You can listen to it here. I transcribed a short section that summarizes some of the points I find myself making in different contexts. This is a light edit (including taking out a couple things I disagree with myself on).

Independence

Q: Tell us more about some of the factors that are at work here. Some people say, well, back in the day my grandmother of course got married because she wasn’t going to have much of a job anyway, but now women have great jobs, so, that’s why they’re not getting married. True or false?

A: That is probably the biggest factor. Not just employment, but really independence. For women especially but for young adults overall. And that is, increased educational opportunities, increased employment opportunities, and the extended young adulthood, or what some people call extended adolescence. Just going to college into your 20s, and delaying that entry into marriage.

I’m not sure that if people are marrying less or marrying later we should equate this with a decline in respect or the importance of marriage. In some ways marriage is more important now that it’s more often a choice. That is people elevate it in their minds or in the culture because – when everybody had to be married, and it was virtually universal around 1960, it wasn’t something that that people personally chose. And so, yes it was important in the sense that everyone was doing it, but now it’s reached the point where people are much more likely to say: This marriage is not good, it’s not working, it’s not what I imagine a marriage should be, therefore we’re going to divorce. Or: We have a vision for marriage which is exalted, and we want to have our marriage take place when we have arrived, and we’re ready to own a house or a decent place to live, we have good jobs, to provide something for our children – and therefore because of that high view of marriage, we’re going to delay marriage. And so that may end up reducing the numbers of married people also, but not because people don’t value marriage.

Uncertainty

One way to think about the high divorce rate – which people are aware of – is it’s a kind of uncertainty that hangs over people. But it’s only one kind. In many ways life is less predictable and more uncertain than it was a few decades ago. And that just makes it difficult for a person to make long-term plans and commitments. We see this in the economic sphere, definitely, where people change careers and jobs more often than they did in the past. In housing, where they may change where they live more often. In a variety of ways our lives are less predictable. And when you don’t know what the future holds in one arena it’s very hard to make a commitment in another. You wouldn’t want to pick your job and make a lifetime commitment to it before you know what your college major is going to be. And in the same way, it’s difficult to make a commitment in marriage before you know what career you’re going to have, or how long you’re going to spend in school. So the uncertainty in one realm translates into cautiousness in others.

[Here I recommended All the Single Ladies by Rebecca Traister and Going Solo by Eric Klinenberg.]

There are different kinds of freedom in play here, and they’re somewhat contradictory. If you have a long-term commitment, that gives you one kind of freedom, for example the freedom to experiment, to make changes in your lifestyle, to change jobs, to take time off from work. Or things that you can do with the security of knowing that the other person is there to back you up. On the other hand, of course, the freedom of being single is a different kind of freedom, is the freedom to not have the set of burdens and obligations that do come from marriage or any kind of long-term commitment. So I do think it’s possible to consider the pros and cons that go in both ways, and it does get back to that idea of uncertainty in life, and the idea of tying oneself down to a long-term commitment in the absence of predictability in all the other aspects of life just seems increasingly disjointed to people. It doesn’t resonate with a lot of people.

The economic argument for marriage has always been that – like contracts, in the economy in general – when you make a commitment, it increases predictability, and you can make long-term plans and investments. For example, you can take a year off to invest in some training, and not worry that you’re going to end up losing income in the long run. And then you also have the economies of scale, two people sharing one refrigerator and one car is more efficient. And then there also are effects of marriage on people’s behavior. The fact that people are relying on you may make people, especially men, behave more responsibly. That may not have to happen within marriage, but the idea of having people depend on you may make people, for example, focus on their career advancement more than other kinds of ambitions.

Defamilialization

So it’s a challenge for our economy and our welfare state to think about: how can we ensure the wellbeing of people who do not have the two-person marriage – if we can’t assume people have that to back them up, economically speaking, and especially their children. But we’ve been going in that direction for a long time. The introduction of Social Security, retirement for older people, the public education system, we’ve been making investments in people to make them less reliant for their survival on their families for a long time, and in the long run that’s an important part of modern society. There’s a downside and an upside to that. The upside is people can act according to their own ambitions and desires individually, with more freedom than they could in the past. The downside is the expense for state institutions of caring for them and their children. It’s a complicated set of tradeoffs, and I think the important thing to realize is we can’t build our policies around the assumption that everybody and their parents are going to be married forever. And if we do that we’re going to leave a lot of people out, and put a lot of people at risk for real hardship.

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SocArXiv in development

Print

Readers of the blog have become familiar with my complaints about our publishing system (scan the academia tag for examples): it’s needlessly slow, inefficient, hierarchical, profit-driven, exploitative, and also doesn’t work well.

Simple example: a junior scholar sends a perfectly reasonable sociology paper to a high-status journal. The editor commissions three anonymous reviews, and four months later the paper is rejected on the basis of a few hours of their volunteer labor. This increases the value — and subscription price — of the for-profit journal, because its high rejection rate is a key selling point. The author will now revise the paper (some of the advice was good, but nothing to suggest the analysis or conclusions were actually wrong) and send it to another journal, where three more anonymous reviewers — having no access to the previous round of review and exchange — will donate a few hours labor to a different for-profit publisher. In a few months we’ll find out what happens. Repeat. The outcome will be a good paper, improved by the process, published 1-3 years after it was written — during which time the paper, the code, and the data, were not available to anyone else. It will be available for $39.95 to non-academics, but most of the people who are aware of it will be able to read it because their institutions buy it as part of a giant bundle of journals from the publisher. The writer may get a job and, later, tenure. Thus, the process produces a good paper, inaccessible to most of the world, as well as a person dependent on the process, one with the institutional position and incentive to perpetuate it for another generation. There’s more wrong than this, but that’s the basic idea. The system is not completely non-functional, it’s just very bad.

With current technology, replacing our outdated journal system is not difficult. We could save vast amounts of money while providing free, faster access to research for everyone. Like our healthcare system, academic publishing is laboring under the weight of supporting its usurious middlemen. Getting them out of the way is a problem of politics and organization, not technology or cost. We academics do all the work already – research, writing, reviewing, editing – contributing our labor without compensation to giant companies that claim to be helping us get and keep our incredibly privileged jobs. But most of us are supported directly or indirectly by the state and our students (or their banks), not the journal publishers. We don’t need most of what the journal publishers do any more, and working for them is degrading our research, making it less innovative and transformative, less engaging and engaged, less open and accountable.

SocArXiv

The people in math and physics developed a workaround for this system in arXiv.org, where people share papers before they are peer-reviewed. Other paper servers have arisen as well, including some run by universities and some run privately for profit, some in specific disciplines. But there is a need for a new general, open-access, open-source, paper server for the social sciences, one that encourages linking and sharing data and code, that serves its research to an open metadata system, and that provides the foundation for a post-publication review system. I hope that SocArXiv will enable us to save research from the journal system. Once its built, anyone will be able to use it to organize their own peer-review community, to select and publish papers (though not exclusively), to review and comment on each other’s work — and to discover, cite, value, and share research unimpeded. We will be able to do this because of the brilliant efforts of the Center for Open Science (which is already developing a new preprint server) and SHARE (“a free, open, data set about research and scholarly activities across their life cycle”).

And we hope you’ll get involved: sharing research, reviewing, moderating, editing, mobilizing. Lots to do, but the good news is we’re doing most of this work already.

SocArXiv won’t take over this blog, though. You can read more about the project, and see the steering committee, in the announcement of our partnership. For updates, you can follow us on Twitter or Facebook, or email to add your name to the mailing list. In fact, you can also make a tax-deductible contribution to SocArXiv through the University of Maryland here.

When your paper is ready, check SocArXiv.org.

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Life table says divorce rate is 52.7%

After the eternal bliss, there are two ways out of marriage: divorce or death.

I have posted my code and calculations for divorce rates using the 2010-2012 American Community Survey as an Open Science Framework project. The files there should be enough to get you started if you want to make multiple-decrement life tables for divorce or other things.

Because the American Community survey records year of marriage, and divorce and widowhood, it’s perfectly set up for a multiple-decrement life table approach. A multiple-decrement life table uses the rate of each of two exits for each year of the original state (in this case marriage), to project the probability of either exit happening at or after a given year of marriage. It’s a projection of current rates, not a prediction of what will happen. So, if you write a headline that says, “your chance of divorce if you marry today is 52.7%,” that would be too strong, because it doesn’t take into account that the world might change. Also, people are different.

The divorce rate of 52.7% can accurately be described like this: “If current divorce and widowhood rates remain unchanged, 52.7% of today’s marriages would end in divorce before widowhood.” Here is a figure showing the probability of divorce at or after each year of the model:

div-mdlt

So there’s 52.7% up at year 0. Marriages that make it to year 15 have a 30% chance of eventually divorcing, and so on.

Because the ACS doesn’t record anything about the spouses of divorce or widowed people, I don’t know who was married to whom, such as age, education, race-ethnicity, or even the sex of the spouse. So the estimates differ by sex as well as other characteristics. I estimated a bunch of them in the spreadsheet file on the OSF site, but here are the bottom lines, showing, for example, that second or higher-order marriages have a 58.5% projected divorce rate and Blacks have a 64.2% divorce rate, compared with 52.9% for Whites.

div-mdlt-tab

(The education ones should be taken with a grain of salt because education levels can change but this assumes they’re static.)

Check the divorce tag for other posts and papers on divorce.

The ASA-style citation to the OSF project would be like this:  Cohen, Philip N. 2016. “Multiple-Decrement Life Table Estimates of Divorce Rates.” Retrieved (osf.io/zber3).

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Eran Shor responds

On May 8 I wrote about three articles by Eran Shor, Arnout van de Rijt, Charles Ward, Aharon Blank-Gomel, and Steven Skiena. (My post is here; the articles, in chronological order, are available in full here, here, and here.)

Eran Shor, associate professor of sociology at McGill University and first author of the papers in question, has sent me the following response, which I agreed to post unedited. I have not heard from the other authors, and Shor does not claim to speak for them here. I’m not responding to this now, except to say that I stand by the original post. Feel free to make (moderated) comments below.

Eran Shor’s response

We would like to thank Philip N. Cohen for posting this response to his blog, unedited.

Philip N. Cohen wrote a post in which he targets three of our recently published articles and claims that these are overlapping and misleading to readers. On the one hand, Cohen clarifies that he is “not judging Shor et al. for any particular violation of specific rules or norms” and “not judging the quality of the work overall.” However, in his conclusions he speaks about “overlapping papers”, “selling duplicative information as new” and “misleading readers”. We feel this terminology more than just hints at intentional wrongdoing. The first response to the blog outright accuses us of self-plagiarism, deceitfulness, and having questionable ethics, which we believe is directly the result of Cohen’s suggestive language.

Below, we explain why we feel that these accusations are unfair and mostly unsubstantiated. We also reflect on the debate over open science and on the practice of writing blogs that make this kind of accusations without first giving authors the chance to respond to them.

As for the three articles in question, we invite readers to read these for themselves and judge whether each makes a unique and original contribution. To quickly summarize these contributions as we see them:

  • The first article, published in Journalism Studies (2014), focuses on the historical development of women’s media representation, presenting new data that goes back to the 19th Century and discussing the historical shifts and differences between various sections of the newspaper.
  • The second article, published in Social Science Quarterly (2014) begins to tackle possible explanations for the persistent gap in representation and specifically focuses on the question of political partisanship in the media and its relationship with gendered coverage patterns. We use two separate measures of newspapers’ political slant and conduct bivariate analyses that examine the association between partisanships and representation.
  • The third article was published in the American Sociological Review (2015). In it, we conducted a wide-scope examination of a large variety of possible explanations for the persistent gender gap in newspapers. We presented a large gamut of new and original data and analyses (both bivariate and multivariate), which examined explanations such as “real-world” inequalities, newsroom composition, and various other factors related to both the newspapers themselves and the cities and states in which they are located.

Of note, these three articles are the result of more than seven years of intensive data collection from a wide variety of sources and multiple analyses, leading to novel contributions to the literature. We felt (and still do) that these various contributions could not have been clearly fleshed out in one article, not even a longer article, such as the ones published by the American Sociological Review.

Now for the blog: Did SSQ really “scoop” ASR?

First, where we agree with Cohen’s critique: the need to indicate clearly when one is presenting a piece of data or a figure that already appeared in another paper. Here, we must concede that we have failed, although certainly not intentionally. The reason we dropped the ball on this one is the well-established need to try to conceal one’s identity as long as a paper is under review, in order to maintain the standard of double-blind review. Clearly, we should have been more careful in checking the final copies of the SSQ and ASR articles and add a clarification stating that the figure already appeared in an earlier paper. Alternatively, we could have also dropped the figure from the paper and simply refer readers to the JS paper, as this figure was not an essential component of either of the latter two papers. As for the issue of the missing year in the ASR paper, this was simply a matter of re-examining the data and noting that the data for 1982 was not strong enough, as it relied on too few data points and a smaller sample of newspapers, and therefore was not equivalent to data from the following years. We agree, however, that we should have clarified this in the paper.

That said, as Cohen also notes in his blog, in each of the two latter papers (SSQ and ASR), the figure in question is really just a minor descriptive element, the starting point for a much larger—and different in each article—set of data and analyses. In both cases, we present the figure at the beginning of the paper in order to motivate the research questions and subsequent analyses and we do not claim that this is one of our novel findings or contributions. The reason we reproduced this figure is that reviewers of previous versions of the paper asked us to demonstrate the persistent gap between women and men in the news. The figure serves as a parsimonious and relatively elegant visual way to do that, but we also presented data in the ASR paper from a much larger set of newspapers that establishes this point. Blind-review norms prevented us from referring readers to our own work in a clear way (that is, going beyond simply including a citation to the work). Still, as noted above, we take full responsibility for not making sure to add a clearer reference to the final version. But we would like to emphasize that there was no intentional deceit here, but rather a simple act of omission. This should be clear from the fact that we had nothing to gain from not referring to our previous work and to the fact that these previous findings motivated the new analyses.

Duplicated analyses?

As for the other major charge against us in the blog, it is summarized in the following paragraph:

It looks to me like the SSQ and ASR they used the same data to test the same hypothesis (in addition to whatever else is new in the third paper). Given that they are using the same data, how they got from a “weak to moderate relationship” to “no significant relationship” seems important. Should we no longer rely on the previous analysis? Or do these two papers just go into the giant heap of studies in which “some say this, some say that”? What kind of way is this to figure out what’s going on?

Here we feel that Cohen is presenting a false picture of what we did in the two papers. First, the SSQ paper actually used two measures of political slant. For both measures, we presented bivariate analyses of the relationship between slant and coverage (which indeed shows a weak to moderate relationship). It is important to stress here that this somewhat rudimentary analysis was simply a matter of data availability: The bivariate cross-sectional analysis was the best analysis we could perform at the time when the paper was accepted for publication (end of 2013), given the data that we had available. However, during the following two years, leading to the publication of the article in ASR at the end of 2015, we engaged in an extensive and time-consuming process of collecting and coding additional data. This effort allowed us to code longitudinal data on important characteristics of newspapers (e.g., identity of editors and publishers and various city and state-related characteristics) for a subset of the newspapers in our sample and for six consecutive years.

And so, as is often the case when moving from a cross-sectional bivariate analysis (SSQ) to a longitudinal multivariate one (ASR), the previous weak relationship that we found for slant basically disappeared, or rather, it became non-significant. In the ASR paper, we did refer readers to the results of our previous study, although without providing details about the analysis itself, because we did not wish to single out our own work in a paragraph that also briefly cites the results of other similar studies (Potter (1985); Adkins Covert and Wasburn (2007)). Perhaps we should have clarified better in the final draft that we previously examined this relationship in a cross-sectional bivariate analysis. But this is a far cry from the allegation that we were reproducing the same analysis, or that we intentionally concealed evidence, both of which are simply false.

To be clear: While the SSQ paper presented a cross-sectional bivariate analysis, in the ASR paper we used a somewhat different sample of papers to perform a longitudinal multivariate analysis, in which newspaper slant was but one of many variables. These are important differences (leading to different results), which we believe any careful reader of the two papers can easily detect. Readers of the ASR article will also notice that the testing of the political slant question is not a major point in the paper, nor is it presented as such. In fact, this variable was originally included as merely a control variable, but reviewers asked that we flesh out the theoretical logic behind including it, which we did. We therefore feel that Cohen’s above comment (in parentheses)—“In addition to whatever else is new in the third paper”—is unfair to the point of being disingenuous. It ignores the true intent of the paper and its (many) unique contributions, for the purpose of more effectively scoring his main point.

As for the paragraph that Cohen cites in the blog, in which we use very similar language to theoretically justify the inclusion of the newspaper slant variable in the ASR analysis, we would like to clarify that this was simply the most straightforward way of conveying this theoretical outline. We make no pretense or implication whatsoever that this passage adds anything new or very important in its second iteration. And again, we do refer the readers to the previous work (including our own), which found conflicting evidence regarding this question in cross sectional bivariate analyses. Knowledge is advanced by building on previous work (your own and others) and adding to it, and this is exactly what we do here.

Misleading readers and selling duplicated information as new?

Given our clarifications above, we feel that the main charges against us are unjust. The three papers in question are by no means overlapping duplications (although the one particular descriptive figure is). In fact, none of the analyses in SSQ and ASR are overlapping, and each paper made a unique contribution at the time it was published. Furthermore, the charges that we are “selling duplicate information as new” and “misleading readers” clearly imply that we have been duplicitous and dishonest in this research effort. It is not surprising that such inflammatory language ended up inciting respondents to the blog to accuse us flatly of self-plagiarism, deceitfulness, and questionable ethics.

In response to such accusations, we once again wish to state very clearly that at no point did we intend to deceive readers or intentionally omit information about previous publications. While we admit to erring in not clearly mentioning in the caption of the figure that it was already reported in a previous study, this was an honest mistake, and one which did not and could not be to our benefit in any way whatsoever. An error of omission it was, but not a violation of any ethical norms.

Is open access the solution?

We would also like to comment on the more general claim of the blog about the system being broken and the solution lying in open access briefly. We would actually like to express our firm support for Cohen’s general efforts to promote open science. We also agree with the need to both carefully monitor and rethink our publication system, as well as with the call for open access to journals and a more transparent reviewing process. All of these would bring important benefits and the conversation over them should continue.

However, we question the assumption that in this particular case an open access system would have solved the problem of not mentioning that our figure appeared in previous articles. As we note above, this omission was actually triggered by the blind review system and our attempts to avoid revealing our identity during the reviewing process (and later on to our failure to remember to add more direct references to our previous work in the final version of the article). But surely, most reviewers who work at academic institutions have access through their local libraries to a broad range of journals, including ones that are behind paywalls (and certainly to most mainstream journals). Our ASR paper was reviewed by nine different anonymous reviewers, as well as by the editorial board. It seems reasonable to assume that virtually all of them would have been able to access the previous papers published in mainstream journals. So the fact that our previous articles were published in journals with paywalls seems neither here nor there for the issues Cohen raises about our work.

A final word: On the practice of making personal accusations in a blog without first soliciting a response from the authors

The commonly accepted way to proceed in our field is that when one scholar wishes to criticize the published work of another, they write a comment to the journal that published the article. The journal then solicits a response from the authors who are being criticized, and a third party then decides whether this is worthy of publication. Readers then get the chance to read both the critique and the response at the same time and decide which point of view they find more convincing. It seems to us that this is the decent way of proceeding in cases where there are different points of view or disagreement over scholarly findings and interpretations. Moreover, when the critique involves charges (or hints) of unethical behavior and academic dishonesty. In such cases, this norm of basic decency seems to us to be even more important. In our case, Professor Cohen did not bother to approach us, and did not ask us to respond to the accusations against us. In fact, we only learned about the post by happenstance, when a friend directed our attention to the blog. When we responded and asked Cohen to make some clarifications to the original posting, we were turned down, although Cohen kindly agreed to publish this comment to his blog, unedited, for which we are thankful.

Of course, online blogs are not expected to honor the norms of civilized scholarly debate to the letter. They are a different kind of forum. Clearly, they have their advantages in terms of both speed and accessibility, and they form an important part of the current academic discourse. But it seems to us that, especially in such cases where allegations of ethically questionable conduct are being made, the authors of blogs should adopt a more careful approach. After all, this is not merely a matter of academic disagreements; people’s careers and reputations are at stake. We would like to suggest that in such cases the authors of blogs should err on the side of caution and allow authors to defend themselves against accusations in advance and not after the fact, when much of the damage has already been done.

 

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Delayed parenting and anti-poverty policy

Here’s a preview of talk today at Brown University’s population center.

My basic argument is that policies intended to prevent poverty by delaying parenthood are mostly misplaced, especially with regard to Black women. Not that delaying parenthood is bad per se, but delaying parenthood in the absence of other improvements in people’s conditions is ineffectual in the aggregate, and actually harmful for some populations.

The delayed childbearing argument features prominently in the recent “consensus” on anti-poverty strategy reached by the American Enterprise Institute / Brookings working group I wrote about here. They say:

It would be better for couples, for children, and for society if prospective parents plan their births and have children only when they are financially stable, are in a committed relationship (preferably marriage), and can provide a stable environment for their child.

Isabel Sawhill, a leading proponent of delayed childbearing as anti-poverty strategy, says in her book Generation Unbound, that she is not telling poor people not to have children, but she sort of is. She writes:

It is only fair to expect parents to limit the number of children they have to something they can afford.

The evidence I offer to help argue that this approach is unhelpful includes this paper (the actual new research for the talk), which shows the risk of infant mortality rising with parent age for Black mothers, a pattern strikingly different from White and Hispanic mothers’ (see a discussion here). Here’s that result:

Fig2

Adjusted Probability of Infant Death, by Maternal Age: White, Black, and Mexican Mothers, U.S., 2013. Predicted probabilities of infant death generated by Stata margins command, adjusted for plurality, birth order, maternal education, prenatal care, payment source, and cigarette smoking during pregnancy. Data source: 2013 Period Linked Birth/Infant Death Public Use File, Centers for Disease Control.

Of course, infant mortality is thankfully very rare, but it’s the extreme measure for the underlying pattern of women’s health. When infant mortality in a group is higher, their average health is usually worse.

I’m adding to that the following descriptive figures on children’s poverty rates according to how old their mothers were when they were born. This is by necessity limited to children who are still living with their mothers, because I used the Current Population Survey. I show this for all children (black lines), and then for those whose mothers have never married (red lines). The solid lines are official poverty-line rates, and the dotted lines use the Supplemental Poverty Measure. The latter shows lower poverty rates for children whose mothers were younger, because it reflects transfer income and welfare support as well as income from unmarried cohabiting partners.

cpsbrown

For children overall (black lines), being born to an older mother appears beneficial in terms of poverty rates. This fits the standard story, in which delaying births allows women to go further in school and their careers, and get married, as well as being more mature and so on. However, for those whose mothers remain unmarried the relationship is much weaker, and there is no relationship to the SPM. To me this undermines the policy of delay with regard to women who have low probability of marriage during their child-bearing years. Which brings me back to Black women.

I estimated the same pattern by race/ethnicity, this time just using the SPM, in a model that controls for child age, sex, nativity, geography, and mother’s marital status (ever- versus never-married). I didn’t control for education, because schooling is also an outcome of birth timing (so if young mothers don’t go to college for that reason, this would show them more likely to be poor as a result). Here’s the result:

bw-kid-predict-no-educ

For White women there is a strong relationship, with lowest poverty rates for children whose mothers were in their 30s when they were born. For Black and Hispanic women the relationship is much weaker (it actually looks very similar when you control for education as well, and if you use the continuous income-to-needs ration instead of the poverty-line cutoff).

My conclusion is that I’m all for policies that make family planning available, and U.S. women should have better access to IUDs in particular (which are much more common in other rich countries) — these need to be part of better medical care for poor people in general. But I don’t favor this as a poverty-reduction strategy, and I reject the “responsibility” frame for anti-poverty policy evident in the quotes above. I prefer education, jobs, and income support (which Sawhill also supports, to her credit). See Matt Bruenig on the Brookings “Success Sequence” and my op-ed on income support.

Ideals and intentions

Consider this from Sawhill. In her book Generation Unbound, she writes:

‘poor and minority women … themselves do not want to have as many children as they are currently having. Unintended pregnancy rates are much higher among the poor, minority groups, and the less-educated … [free, better contraception] can help poorer and less-educated women align their behavior with their intentions.’ (p. 138)

I think we need to take a little more complicated view of intentions here. She is referring to what demographers call “unintended” births, which means the woman recalls that she was not intending to get pregnant at the time — she either wanted to get pregnant some time in the future, or never. As you can see, such unintended pregnancies are very common:

unintended

However, most poor women think the ideal family size is large. Among young women, 65% of women who didn’t finish high school, and 48% of those with high school degrees but no BA, believe 3 or more children is the ideal for a family:

idealed

For lots of their births, poor women were not ready, or not planning to get pregnant. But it’s also common for poor people to never achieve their ideal conditions for having children — good job, marriage, housing, education, and so on. In that case, with the clock running on their (and their mothers’) health, unintended childbearing is more complicated than just a behavior problem to be solved. It may reflect a compromise between unachievable goals.

In addition to making sure everyone has the reproductive healthcare they need (including more effective contraception), I think we should also help people achieve their long-term ideals — including having the children they want to have — rather than (just) help them realize their short-term intentions.

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Families and modern social theory

Just realized I never posted the syllabus for my new graduate seminar, “Families and modern social theory.” We’re 9 weeks into and I at least am getting a lot out of it. Feel free to share your comments or suggestions. A PDF version is here, but I also just pasted it below.

Syllabus

This course is designed to build knowledge theories of modernity with emphasis on modern families. Thus, it combines some core theories of modernity (Giddens, Bourdieu, Foucault), with key theoretical debates about families and intimate relationships (economics and economic sociology, gender, race), and social change (development and new family forms).

Students will read nine books and a variety of articles. They will write a response paper each week, and an exploratory essay or research report at the end of the semester.

Evaluation will be based on participation, weekly writings, and the final paper.

Part I: Modernity

1. What is modernity?

  • Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. John Wiley & Sons

2. Modern relationships

  • Giddens, Anthony. 1993. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love, and Eroticism in Modern Societies. 1st edition. Stanford University Press.

3. Habitus and field

  • Bourdieu, Pierre. 1998. Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Stanford University Press.

4. Discipline

  • Foucault, Michel. 2012. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

Part II: Families

5. New families

  • Rosenfeld, Michael J. 2007. The Age of Independence: Interracial Unions, Same-Sex Unions, and the Changing American Family. Harvard University Press.

6. Economics over all

  • Becker, Gary S. 1993. A Treatise on the Family: Enlarged Edition. Enlarged edition. Harvard University Press (excerpts TBA).
  • Bergmann, Barbara R. 1996. “Becker’s Theory of the Family: Preposterous Conclusions.” Challenge 39 (1): 9–12.
  • England, Paula. 1989. “A Feminist Critique of Rational-Choice Theories: Implications for Sociology.” The American Sociologist 20 (1): 14–28.
  • We’ll also discuss this terrible video:

7. Economic sociology of intimacy

  • Zelizer, Viviana A. 2009. The Purchase of Intimacy. Princeton University Press.

8. Family economics for real

  • Folbre, Nancy. 2009. Valuing Children: Rethinking the Economics of the Family. Harvard University Press.

9. Gender and families

  • Hartmann, Heidi I. 1981. “The Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The Example of Housework.” Signs 6 (3): 366–94.
  • Ferree, Myra Marx. 2010. “Filling the Glass: Gender Perspectives on Families.” Journal of Marriage and Family 72 (3): 420–39. doi:10.1111/j.1741-3737.2010.00711.x.
  • Yodanis, Carrie, and Sean Lauer. 2014. “What Couples Actually Do: Is Marriage Individualized?” Journal of Family Theory & Review 6 (2): 184–97. doi:10.1111/jftr.12038.10.

10. Black families, uncertainty, and exclusion

  • Burton, Linda M., and M. Belinda Tucker. 2009. “Romantic Unions in an Era of Uncertainty: A Post-Moynihan Perspective on African American Women and Marriage.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 621 (January): 132–48.
  • Geronimus, Arline T. 2003. “Damned If You Do: Culture, Identity, Privilege, and Teenage Childbearing in the United States.” Social Science & Medicine 57 (5): 881–93. doi:10.1016/S0277-9536(02)00456-2.
  • Collins, Patricia Hill. 2001. “Like One of the Family: Race, Ethnicity, and the Paradox of US National Identity.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24 (1): 3–28. doi:10.1080/014198701750052479.

Part III: Development and change

11. Modernity, development, and demography

  • Thornton, Arland. 2001. “The Developmental Paradigm, Reading History Sideways, and Family Change.” Demography 38 (4): 449–65. doi:10.2307/3088311.
  • Greenhalgh, Susan. 2003. “Science, Modernity, and the Making of China’s One-Child Policy.” Population and Development Review 29 (2): 163–96.
  • Kirk, Dudley. 1996. “Demographic Transition Theory.” Population Studies 50 (3): 361–87. doi:10.1080/0032472031000149536.
  • Lesthaeghe, R. “The Second Demographic Transition in Western Countries: An Interpretation.” In Mason, Karen Oppenheim, and An-Magritt Jensen (eds.). 1995. Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries. Clarendon Press.

12. Decoupling, families, and modernity

  • Stacey, Judith. 2011. Unhitched: Love, Marriage, and Family Values from West Hollywood to Western China. New York University Press.

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More on racist Trump supporters, and My 3Qs

It’s been hard for me to stay out of electoral politics debates lately (follow the elections tag if you’re having the same problem).

The latest is another piece with Sean McElwee in Salon. It again features my analysis of the ANES 2016 pilot survey, with Sean’s write-up, this time focusing on attitudes of White Trump supporters toward Blacks. The short answer is White Trump supporters stereotype Blacks more than other Republican or Democrat Whites, and people with self-described “cold” feelings toward Blacks are most likely to support Trump. The biggest difference was on answers to the question, “How well does the word ‘lazy’ describe most blacks?”

race figures.xlsx

This ANES data has lots of potential for addressing the pressing questions on a breaking-news basis. Whether it holds up (it’s an opt-in online survey) is yet to be seen, but I haven’t seen a reason to think it would be biased toward producing racist Trump supporters. So I think it’s worth doing. (I’ve also discovered that when you criticize Trump on a popular website like Salon, and have a Jewish name, you attract anti-Semitic Twitter.)

My 3 Qs

In other news, I did a short interview with Molly McNulty, the Council on Contemporary Families pubic affairs intern at Framingham State University.  It’s reprinted here from the CCF site on The Society Pages:

TSP readers likely appreciate Philip Cohen for his provocative blog, Family Inequality, which—based on a look at who retweets him—regularly has material valued by undergraduates, senior scholars, data nerds, policy wonks, and journalists alike. Cohen is a Council on Contemporary Families senior scholar and a professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland in College Park, Maryland. His research focuses on the sociology of families, social demography, and social inequality. His family textbook, The Family: Diversity, Inequality, and Social Change, was published in 2014. Cohen gave me these useful answers to my “3q”:

Q: First, a challenge: What’s one single thing you “know” with certainty, after years of research into modern families?

PC: Family inequality is remarkably resilient, but when it changes it does so under the influence of external forces. When women’s opportunities increase (or men’s decrease), when public investment in education increases, when the legal environment changes when technology permits reductions in household labor, when policies lighten (or compensate) the load of caring labor — that’s when inequality within families shifts. There is a dialectic here, and micro-level interactions within families matter, but these external forces are in the historical driver’s seat.

Q: Give us the “Twitter” version of your current research—in 140 characters (give or take), what are you working on now?

PC: This is what I’m working on today, in 140 characters: The culture wars over family politics always return to gender difference itself; it’s what’s at stake when left & right fight over families.

Q: How would you encourage a scholar of family life to work to get their research into public life, affecting policy and challenging assumptions about “average families”?

PC: The public loves to argue about families. There are lots of opportunities to get your work out there and make it relevant. Unlike some areas of sociological research, if you’re working on families, almost everything has a potential angle — in fact, one of the challenges is to not oversell the implications of our research. There is also a lot of translational work to do — interpreting and explaining new data and research as it comes out, helping people figure out what to make of the latest findings in the context of what we already know rather than participating in the whipsaw advice machine that thrives on contradicting conventional wisdom. I recommend that junior scholars get involved with the Council on Contemporary Families, which helps organize and transmit new research responsibly and effectively, and to look for opportunities to publish popular pieces in online venues that encourage well-reasoned and empirically-grounding discussion and debate.

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